In a quantal response equilibrium, players are assumed to make errors in choosing which pure strategy to play.
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Certain static and dynamic types of bounded-rational models of a potential game result in a stationary state that is the Gibbs measure, which is closely related to the quantal response equilibrium.
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He has authored influential papers in the fields of political economy ( " Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty " with Howard Rosenthal, APSR 1985 ), game theory ( " Quantal Response Equilibria in Normal Form Games " with Richard McKelvey, GEB 1995 ), implementation ( " Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies " with S . Srivastava, Econometrica 1991 ), and experimental economics ( " An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game " with R . McKelvey, Econometrica 1992 ).